Renzo v. Idaho State Dept. of Agr. Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 36672 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
1-20-2010
Renzo v. Idaho State Dept. of Agr. Appellant's Reply
Brief Dckt. 36672
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.
Recommended Citation
"Renzo v. Idaho State Dept. of Agr. Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 36672" (2010). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 218.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/218
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
PETER RENZO, dlbla S.A.B.R.E. 
FOUNDATION, INC., 
PlaintiffIAppellant, 
VS. 
IDAHO STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
AGRICULTURE, 
DefendantRespondent. 
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District for Bingham County 
SUPREME COURT 
DOCKET NO. 36672-2009 
Honorable Darren B. Simpson, District Judge presiding 
Nick L. Nielson C. Timothy Hopkins 
Attorney at Law Hopkins, Roden, Crockett, Hansen, & Hoopes 
120 North 12" Avenue, Suite 7 428 Park Avenue 
P.O. Box 6159 P.O. Box 51219 
Pocatello, ID 83205 Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1219 
Attorney for -4ppellant Attorneys for Respondents 
TABLE OF 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CASES AND AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 
11. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8  
111. ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8 
111. THE STATE OF IDAHO OWED A DUTY TO RENZO AND WAS GROSSLY NEGLIGENT 
INTHEPERFORMANCEOFTHATDUTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13 
IV. THESTATEOF IDAHO, THROUGH DR. LEDBETTER, COMMITTED A WRONGFUL AND 
UNLAWFUL ACTION WITHOUT LEGAL JUSTIEICATION OR EXCUSE AND WITH ILL WILL . . . . 17 
V. THE STATE OF IDAHO TORTIOUSLY INTERFERED WITH SABRE'S PROSPECTNE 
ECONOMICADVANTAGECLAIM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19 
VI. ISDA OWED A DUTY TO RENZO TO PREVENT ECONOMIC LOSS AND BREACHED 
THATDUTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21 
VII. SABRE'S NOTICE OF TORT CLAIM WAS TIMELY FILED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23  
VIE. RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES MUST BE DENIED . . . . . . . .25 
. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
STATE CASES 
Anderson v . Citv of Pocatello. 112 Idaho 176.73 1 P.2d 171 (1986) . . . . . . . . .  
Babbitt v . Swc 
515 U.S. 68; 
:et Home Chapter of communities for a Great orepin. 
r(1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11. 12 
Beard v . George. 135 Idaho 685. 23 P.3d 147 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9 
Bensman v . U.S. Forest Service. 984 F.Supp. 1242. (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12 
Bissett v . Unnamed Members of Political Compact. 
111 Idaho 863. 727 P.2d 1291 (Ct . App . 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25 
Blahd v . Richard B . Smith. Inc.. 141 Idaho 296.301. 108 P.3d 996 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21 
Caudle v . Bonneville County. 2009.D-0506.078 (Ct . App . April 30. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . .  25 
Cordova v . Bonnevile Countv Joint Sch . Dist . No . 93. 
144 Idaho 637. 167 P.3d 774 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25 
Clark v . Spokesman-Review. 144 Idaho 427. 163 P.3d 220 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18 
Crown v . State Department of Agriculture. 
127 Idaho 188. 898 P.2d 1099 (Ct . App . 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14. 15 
Curlee v . Kootenai County Fire & Rescue. 2008-ID 1020.142 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18 
Curtis v . Firth. 123 Idaho 598. 850 P.2d 749 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8 
Duffin v . Idaho Crop Improvement Assn.. 126 Idaho 1002. 895 P.2d 1195 . . . . . . . . .  .22. 23 
Electrical Wholesale Supplv Co . Inc . v . Nielson. 136 Idaho 814. 41 P . 3d 242 (2002) . . . .  25 
Evans v . Twin Falls County. 118 Idaho 210. 796 P.2d. 87 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17 
Highland Enterprises . Inc . v . Barker. 133 Idaho 330. 986 P.2d 996 (1999) . . . . . . . . . .  19. 20 
Just's Inc . v . Arrineton Constr . Co.. 99 Idaho 462. 583 P.2d 997 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . .  .22. 23 
Magnuson Properties Partnership v . Citv of Coeur D-Alene. 
138 Idaho 166. 59 P.3d 971 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24 
Marshal1 v . Blair. 130 Idaho 675. 946 P.2d 975 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9 
McDonald v . Paine. 119 Idaho 725. 810 P.2d 259 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8 
McKav Construction Co . v . Ada County. 126 Idaho 923. 894 P.2d 156 (Ct . App . 1995) . . .  8 
Meridian Bowling Lanes v . Meridian Athletic Ass'n . Inc., 
105 Idaho 509. 670 P.2d 1294 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8 
Partnership v . City of Coeur D-Alene. 138 Idaho 166. 59 P.3d 971 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24 
Tenn . Vallev Auth . v . Hill. 437 U.S. 153 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9 
Van v . Portneuf Medical Center. 2009 Opinion No . 92. Docket No . 34888 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9 
FEDERAL STATUTES . U.S. CODE w 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16 U.S.C §1531(b) 10 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16 U.S.C §1531(c)(l) 10 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16 U.S.C $1532(3) 10 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16 U.S.C §1532(13) 10 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16 U3.C §1532(19) 10 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16 U.S.C $1538(a)(l)(B) 10 
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5OCFR 17.3 10. 11 
CONGRESSIONAL REPORTS &g&, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  H . R . REP . NO . 93412. at 5 (1973) 9 
IDAHO STATUTES 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  I.C.56.904 17 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  I.C.56-904(1) 17 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  LC . $6-904B 14 
I.C.§6-918A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25 
I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The nature of the case and course of proceedings have been set forth in Appellants' Brief 
filed by Peter Renzo ("RENZO"), dJb1aS.A.B.R.E. FOUNDATION, INC. ("SABRE"). Respondent, 
Idaho State Department of Agriculture ("ISDA") has submitted its version of the nature of the case 
and course of proceedings in Respondent's Brief. Facts relevant to matters addressed in 
Respondent's Brief are set forth below. 
The S.A.B.R.E Foundation is dedicated to the education of children and general public about 
Siberian tigers and other big cats, and to do whatever possible to prevent their extinction. Affidavit 
of Nick L. Nielson, ("Nielson Affidavit") Exhibit 1, Agency Record, R. Vol. I, p. 116. It is 
absolutely necessary for the mission and purpose of the Foundation to be allowed to breed its cats 
in order to help preserve the endangered species. R. Vol. I, pp. 86-87. However, absolutely nothing 
is mentioned in Respondent's recitation of the facts showing that Dr. Ledbetter considered the 
preservation of an endangered species when he made the decision that "spaying and neutering should 
be required" for acceptance of Peter Renzo's application for a possession permit. Respondent's 
Brief, p. 2. 
In fact, the record indicates that Dr. Ledbetter could not even see how Renzo's tiger breeding 
would somehow benefit tigers in the wild. R. Vol. I, p. 140, Ledbetter Depo., p. 73, LL. 11 - 16. Dr. 
Ledbetter did not talk to any third party about the benefits to the species arising from Renzo's 
breeding efforts. R. Vol. I, p. 140, Ledbetter Depo., p. 73, LL. 21 - 23. Dr. Ledbetter didn't even 
believe that the rules pertaining to deleterious exotic animals g$mJy required spaying and neutering. 
R. Vol. I, p. 132, Dr. Ledbetter Depo., p. 43, LL. 2 - 6. 
In an attempt to bolster Dr. Ledbetter's review of Peter Renzo's application for a possession 
permit, Respondent claims that "Dr. Ledbetter spent 'in excess of a week' reviewing Renzo's 
Application in order to make a decision." Respondent's Brief, p. 1. Respondent fails to state Dr. 
Ledbetter's full testimony on this issue. When asked how much actual time was spent on the 
application, Dr. Ledbetter indicated that he had no way to recall that. R., Vol 1. p. 140, Ledbetter 
Depo., p. 74, LL. 15 - 18. 
Ln reviewing Renzo's application, Dr. Ledbetter did not review Renzo's application for 
renewal of his U.S.D.A. license. R. Vol. I, p. 138, Ledbetter Depo., p. 65, LL. 20 - 25; p. 66, LL. 
1 - 3. Additionally, consideration of Renzo's previous permit from the Department of Fish and 
Game was not a part of Dr. Ledbetter's decision to require spaying and neutering. R. Vol. I, p. 137, 
Ledbetter Depo., p. 63, LL. 20 - 24. Aside from the U.S.D.A inspector in Nevada, neither Dr. 
Ledbetter nor anyone from his office spoke with Renzo's neighbors or with any third party regarding 
Renzo's application. R. Vol. I, pp. 105, 138, Ledbetter Depo., p. 68, LL. 1- 8,14 - 17. 
Dr. Ledbetter understood the rules to meanthat without the administrator's authority, noone, 
including zoos and exhibitors, could possess or propagate deleterious exotic animals. R. Vol. I, pp. 
133 -134. Ledbetter Depo., p. 48, LL. 4 - 25; p. 49, LL. 1 ,7  - 16. Despite this fact, a male lion was 
introduced to the Tautphaus Park Zoo's female lion for the purpose of breeding during Dr. 
Ledbetter's administration. R. Vol. I, p. 154. A lion cub was eventually born at the zoo. R. Vol. 
I, p. 143, Ledbetter Depo., p. 86, LL 23 - 25; p. 87, LL. 1 - 12; R. Vol. I, p. 152. To Dr. Ledbetter's 
knowledge, however, the Tautphaus Park Zoo did not obtain a propagation permit under his or any 
other administration. R. Voi. I, pp. 142-143. Ledbetter Depo., p. 84, LL. 25; p. 85, LL. 1 - 7. Dr. 
Ledbetter didn't know of any breeding programs of any zoos. To his recollection, he didn't even 
-about the fact that there may be breeding in the zoos. R. Vol. I, p. 143, Ledbetter Depo., p. 
85, LL. 8 - 16. 
Respondent states that Dr. Ledbetter was aware of a matter involving ISDA's request of Jerry 
Kor to spay and neuter his exotic cats. Respondent's Brief, p. 2. Respondent appears to infer the 
validity of Dr. Ledbetter's decision requiring Renzo to spay and neuter his cats by stating that 
"Ledbetter believed in being consistent between the two cases as both involved deleterious exotic 
cats. Respondent's Brief, p. 2. Respondent blatantly fails to mention the fact that the only 
similarity between Korn and Renzo's circumstances was that they both involved tigers. There was 
no discussion in Respondent's Brief that Korn illegally possessed tigers, illegally bred tigers, 
illegally transferred tigers, illegally gave a tiger cub to a person not authorized by the State to possess 
the tiger, and repeatedly failed to cooperate with the State, while Renzo complied with all of the 
reauirements in the State's rules. These facts underscore the gross negligence of Dr. Ledbetter's 
decision. 
Respondent points out that Renzo's application indicated "Propagation" as a purpose. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 1. Respondent is claiming that Dr. Ledbetter addressed not only the issue of 
possession, but also of propagation, when hereviewed the application. However, Respondent points 
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to no evidence whatsoever showing that Dr. Ledbetter considered the "propagation" purpose when 
reviewing the application. In fact, Respondent acknowledges that discussion regarding breeding 
licenses between Renzo and Dr. Ledbetter first occurred after Dr. Ledbetter sent his October 17 
letter. Respondent's Brief, p. 3. 
Dr. Ledbetter's conditional approval of Renzo's application, as set forth in his October 17 
letter, also demonstrates Dr. Ledbetter's gross negligence. There was no basis given for the 
sterilization of an endangered species. There was no reason given as to why Renzo's cats could not 
be bred in the State of Idaho with proper precautions. There were no observations of Renzo's 
superior program, the Foundation's secure facilities, Renzo's Exhibitor's license from the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, or Renzo's longstanding experience in breeding and exhibiting the cats. 
R. Vol. I, p. 89. Furthermore, the word "propagation" was never mentioned. R. Vol I, p. 114. 
When Renzo submitted the application for a possession permit, he didn't submit an 
application for a propagation permit. R. Vol. I, p.88. After he learned of the spaying and neutering 
requirement, Renzo spoke with Dr. Ledbetter for the first time about the Foundation's breeding 
programs and the fact that the tigers were critically endangered. R. Vol. I, p. 89. Dr. Ledbetter told 
him that he did not give breeding licenses to individuals and that he wasn't concerned about zoos. 
R. Vol. I, p. 89 - 90. Renzo reiterated that the Foundation's licensing was the same as that used for 
zoos. Dr. Ledbetter then said that he couldn't give licenses to individuals but that he would have 
to check with the attorney general to see if he could do so, but that he didn't expect any 
exceptions to the rule being made. Dr. Ledbetter never called Renzo back. R. Vol. I, pp. 89-90. 
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Rebecca Harris of the Foundation also spoke with Dr. Ledbetter, informing him that the 
Foundation couldn't spay and neuter their tigers as it was against federal law and would utterly 
defeat the Foundation's preservation or breeding programs. Dr. Ledbetter replied that it wasn't 
his problem. R. Vol. I, p. 97. Rebecca left the conversation feeling like she had asked Dr. Ledbetter 
"why are you picking on us?" and was told "Because I can." R. Vol. I, p. 98. 
In light of Dr. Ledbetter's hostility, Peter Renzo retained Idaho counsel who wrote to Dr. 
Ledbetter on November 2,2007, stating, "Zfyou have actually denied orplan to deny the issuance 
of a breedingpermit, I hereby request that you submit to be a written denial . . . ." Counsel also 
stated, "Please indicate whether such [denial] is a fmal agency decision . . . ." The fact that Renzo 
did not know if a wrongful act had occurred is abundantly clear from counsel's statements. 
Evidence in the record undisputedly establishes that Dr. Ledbetter told Renzo that he would 
check with the attorney general to see to if he could issue a propagation permit to Renzo. This 
statement to Renzo clearly re-opens the issue of spaying and neutering. Dr. Ledbetter did not get 
back with Renzo and no evidence in the record shows that Ledbetter had checked with the Attorney 
general or had received a decision from the attorney general by the time he had spoken with Rebecca 
Harris. No decision was communicated and counsel asked for a decision. 
In his November 16,2007 letter, Dr. Ledbetter plainly acknowledged that Renzo's counsel 
"requested that the State of Idaho issue apropagation permit". R., Vol. 1, p. 117. Dr. Ledbetter then 
stated, "The State of Idaho will not issue a Propagation Permit to your client." Dr. Ledbetter 
subsequently stated, "[gliven the Legislature's clear direction, as well as the rule, ISDA will not 
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issue a Propagation Permit. I also re-affirm the decision set forth in my Octoberl7, 2007 
correspondence. ISDA will issue a Possession Permit to your client, but only if the following five 
requirements are met (emphasis added)." R. Vol. I, pp. 117. It is critical to note that in Dr. 
Ledbetter's own words, there was no "reiteration" of a denial of a propagation permit, as Respondent 
would have the Coua believe. This was his very first written denial of propagation permit, as well 
as his final decision, his final sav in the matter. Renzo Affidavit, q[ 13, R. Vol. I, p. 145, Ledbetter 
Depo., p. 94, LL. 23 - 25; p. 95, LL. 1 - 8. This was pronouncement that Renzo was seeking, just 
not the decision he wanted. This was the decisive wrongful act. 
On December 7, 2007, Renzo's counsel sent another letter to Dr. Ledbetter requesting 
reconsideration of the denial. R. Vol. I, pp. 119 - 121. It is significant to note here that a 
reconsideration of the denial of a propagation permit was not made until Dr. Ledbetter actually 
denied it. Logically, had Dr. Ledbetter denied a propagation permit in his October 17 letter, arequest 
for reconsideration would have been made then. The undeniable facts are that Dr. Ledbetter said he 
would check with the attorney general and then on November 16, gave his decision regarding the 
propagation permit, not a reaffirmation but a declaration. 
Respondent stated in its Brief that neither Renzo nor his counsel had made mention of 
"potential contracts" in relation to Renzo's application, and that Dr. Ledbetter did not intend to 
cause a breach of any contract. Respondent's Brief, pp. 1,4.  Respondent apparently disregards 
Renzo's statements to Ledbetter that the Foundation's goal was to bring in money through tourism, 
a hotel and tiger show which would raise awareness of the endangered tiger. R. Vol. I, pp. 89-90. 
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Respondent also disregards Rebecca Harris' statements to Dr. Ledbetter that the Foundation had an 
investor lined up who wanted to build a facility that would be open to the public, similar to Bear 
World, with a Tiger theme that would bring tourism and business to the community. R. Vol. I, p. 
97. Because the Foundation was denied possession and propagation permits, it was precluded from 
building a such a facility and the sponsor that had given offers/consideration to assist with the facility 
withdrew its offers/consideration. R. Vol. I, p. 91. Consequently the Foundation has been in serious 
jeopardy of ending its operations due to losing this sponsorship and funding. R. Vol. I, p. 91. 
The undisputed facts show that Dr. Ledbetter intended to stop the propagation of Renzo's 
endangered tigers in Idaho regardless of any contracts. Dr. Ledbetter's own deposition testimony 
is that any knowledge of such contracts would have changed his decision. R. Vol. I, p. 146, 
Ledbetter Depo., p. 99, LL. 11 - 14. Respondent cannot show that Dr. Ledbetter's actions would 
have been any different had Renzo or his counsel specifically laid oul every detail of a contract. 
Understandably, Respondent says little about what District Judge Ted Wood thought of Dr. 
Ledbetter's treatment of Renzo's application. Respondent's Brief, p. 5. Respondent doesn't touch 
Judge Wood's statement that, "it does appear to this Court that the administrator is basically making 
up the rules as he goes." R. Vol. I, pp. 186-187, Hearing Transcript, p. 5, LL. 19-25, and p. 6, L. 1. 
Respondent also apparently chose not to address Judge Wood's comment that "[wlithout 
standards for discerning ISDA's discretion, ISDA's decision is not subject to any meaningful review, 
thereby limiting the judiciary's role to rubberstamping ISDA's actions and covert reasoning." R. 
Vol. I, pp. 204 - 205. Respondent's whitewashing cannot excuse the impropriety of Dr. Ledbetter's 
decisions as expressed in Judge Wood's findings. 
11. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Respondents' request for attorney fees and costs on appeal under LC. $6-918A must be 
denied. 
111. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When considering an appeal from a motion for summary judgment, the appellate court's 
standard of review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in passing on the motion. 
Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598,610,850 P.2d 749,761 (1993) citing McDonald v. Paine, 119 Idaho 
725, 810 P.2d 259 (1991); Meridim Bowling Lanes v. Meridian Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 105 Idaho 
509,670 P.2d 1294 (1983). The appellate court is to apply such rules to the record before it and 
determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In making this 
determination, the appellate court is required to review and consider the totality of the motions, 
affidavits, depositions, pleadings and attached exhibits contained in the record. Curtis, 123 Idaho 
610, 850 P.2d 761 citing Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176,731 P.2d 171 (1986). 
The role of the appellate court in reviewing the district court's decision is not to supplant 
the lower court's interpretation of the evidence, but to determine whether substantial and competent 
evidence supports the court's determinations. McKay Construction Co. v. Ada County 126 Idaho 
923,925 ,894 P.2d 156,158 (Ct. App. 1995). The appellate court must construe the record in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all reasonable inferences in that 
party's favor. Van v. Portneuf Medical Center, 2009 Opinion No. 92, Docket No. 34888. If 
reasonable people could reach different conclusions or inferences from the evidence, the motion 
must be denied. Id. 
In addressing questions of law, the appellate court is free to draw its own conclusions from 
the evidence which has been presented. Beard v. George, 135 Idaho 685,687,23 P.3d 147, 149 
(2001). The Court may substitute its view on a legal issue for that of the district court. Marshall v. 
Blair, 130 Idaho 675,679,946 P.2d 975,979 (1997). 
I1 
THE DECISIONS OF DR. LEDBETTER AND THE DISTRICT COURT FLY IN THE 
FACE OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
The plain intent of Congress in enacting the Endangered Species Act of 1973 ("ESA") "was 
to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost." Tenn. Valley Auth. v. 
Hill, 437 U.S.  153, 184 (1978). According to the Tenn. Valley Authority Court, this intent is 
"reflected not only in the stated policies of the Act, but in literally every section of the statute." Id. 
In passing the Endangered Species Act, Congress observed: 
From the most narrow possible point of view, it is in the best interest 
of mankind to minimize the losses of genetic variations. The reason 
is simple: they are potential resources. They are keys to puzzles which 
we cannot solve, and may provide answers to questions which we 
have not yet learned to ask. 
H. R. REP. NO. 93412, at 5 (1973). 
Purposes of the ESA included providing" a program for the conservation of.. . endangered 
species and threatened species . . ." 16 U.S.C. §1531(b). Congress declared that policy "that all 
Federal departments and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered species and threatened species 
and shall utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter." I6 U.S.C. 
$153 l(c)(l). Congress defined conservation to include "the use of all methods and procedures which 
are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the 
measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary." 16 U.S.C. §1532(3). 
The "take" prohibition in 16 U.S.C. §1538(a)(l)(B) provides that "it is unlawful for any 
person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to . . . take any such species within the United 
States or the territorial sea of the United States. . . ." The ESA definition of "person" includes ". . 
. any officer, employee, agent, department, or instrumentality of the Federal Government, of any 
State, municipality, or political subdivision of a State, . . . any State, municipality, or political 
subdivision of a State; or any other entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" (emphasis 
added). 16 U.S.C. §1532(13). The term "take" defined in 16 U.S.C. §1532(19) means to "harass, 
harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such 
conduct." 
The definition of "harm" within the definition of "take" in the ESA means: 
an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include 
significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills 
or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral 
patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering. 
50 C.F.R. 17.3 
The definition of "harass" in the definition of "take" in the Act includes the following: 
an intentional or negligent act or omission which creates the 
likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to 
significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns which include, but 
are not limited to, breeding, feeding, or sheltering. This definition, 
when applied to captive wildlife, does not include generally accepted: 
(1) Animal husbandry practices that meet or exceed the minimum 
standards for facilities and care under the Animal Welfare Act . . . . 
50 C.F.R. 17.3 
In Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 
708 (1995)rSweet Home"), the U.S. Supreme Court addressed a challenge to the definition of 
harm, within the definition of "take" in the ESA. Although the issue was whether the definition 
of "harm" included habitat modification, Justice O'Conner, in a concurring opinion, provides 
tremendous insight to the case at hand. Justice O'Conner stated: 
As an initial matter, I do not find it as easy as Justice Scalia does to 
dismiss the notion that significant impairment of breeding injures 
living creatures. To raze the last remaining ground on which the 
piping plover currently breeds, thereby making it impossible for any 
piping plovers to reproduce, would obviously injure the population 
(causing the species' extinction in a generation). But by completely 
preventing breeding, it would also injure the individual living bird, in 
the same way that sterilizing the creature injures the individual living 
bird. To "injure" is, among other things, "to impair." Webster's 
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 5623 (1983). One need not 
subscribe to theories of "psychic harm," cf. post at 734-735, n. 5 to 
recognize that to make it impossible for an animal to reproduce is to 
impair its most essential physical functions and to render that animal, 
and its genetic material, biologically obsolete. This in my view, is 
actual injuy. 
Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 710. 
By requiring Renzo to sterilize his tigers before entry into the State of Idaho, Dr. Ledbetter 
required that Renzo make it impossible for the tigers to reproduce, thereby impairing the tigers' most 
essential physical functions and rendering the tigers and their genetic material, biologically obsolete. 
By requiring sterilization, the State of Idaho, through Dr. Ledbetter, demanded that an unlawful 
"take" occur in direct violation of ESA.' In this light, how can anyone argue that Dr. Ledbetter was 
not grossly negligent, particularly in light of the fact that no Idaho statute required sterilization? 
Renzo alleged in his Complaint that theDepartment of Agriculture wrongfully interfered with 
Plaintiff's prospective economic advantage in part by using improper and unlawful means and 
procedures in demanding spaying and neutering. R. Vol. 1, p. 10. In addressing the harm suffered 
by SABRE, the district court stated: 
The fact that Ledbetter denied Renzo a permit to propagate the tigers 
may have alienated Renzo's ultimate purpose, but it did not interfere 
with the economic advantage Renzo could have enjoyed had he been 
able to abandon his breeding plans. 
* * *  
The harm at issue, according to Renzo, is that Renzo was precluded 
from building a facility for his tigers in the state of Idaho. (Footnote 
and citation omitted). However, Ledbetter's conduct, even if this 
Court assumes it was reckless, willful and wanton, did not preclude 
Renzo from building a facility for his tigers in the state of Idaho. It 
only precluded Renzo from breeding his tigers in the state of Idaho. 
Accordingly, this Court finds that Renzo has not raised issues of 
material fact which would stave off summary judgment as to Renzo's 
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage claim. 
' It should also be noted that in a post Sweet Home case, Bensman v. U.S. Forest Service, 
984 F.Supp. 1242, 1247, (1997)it was decided that the taking prohibition is "broadly construed to 
prohibit nearly any activity which might adversely affect protected species." 
R. Vol. I, pp. 243 - 245. 
When the district court rendered its decision, the court had before it the affidavit testimony 
of Rebecca Harris indicating that the spaying and neutering required was against federal law. The 
direct implications of the district court's rulings are that Renzo has no prospective business 
advantage claim because he could have made money had he just decided to impair the biological 
functions of his tigers and violated the ESA. This reasoning, as previously stated in Renzo's 
Appellant's Brief, flies "in the face of federal laws promoting the preservation of endangered 
species." Appellant's Brief, p. 39. 
The district court failed to address issues pertaining to endangered species in arriving at its 
decision. Because proper consideration of the protection of an endangered species would have 
resulted in a different decision. the decision must not stand. 
I11 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 0-D A DUTY TO RENZO AND WAS GROSSLY 
NEGLIGENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THAT DUTY 
Respondent claims that "Renzo has not established a duty on the part of the ISDA 
Administrator to each applicant for a possession permit." Respondent's Brief, p. 18. Renzo asserts 
that Respondent has totally disregarded the evidence in the record creates a duty on the part of the 
ISDA toward Renzo. 
Respondent makes absolutely no mention of Judge Wood order that when ISDA adopted 
criteria andlor rules for which possession and propagation permits in the future, it was to apply the 
rules and criteria "fairly to Petitioner's application" (emphasis added). R. Vol. I, pp. 70, 190. 
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Obviously, Judge Wood recognized that ISDA had a duty to apply the rules fairly. Isn't it logical 
that if the ISDA applied the rules fairly, and Renzo complied with all of the rules, that the ISDA 
would have a duty to issue a permit? If, as Respondent argues, the ISDA could "use its discretion" 
and deny a permit after all rules were complied with, wouldn't ISDA's actions be in violation of the 
mandate to apply the rules fairly? If ISDA could deny a permit after all rules were complied with, 
we would be right back to the issue of "making up your own rules as you go" which Judge Wood 
was trying to prevent. 
The duty to apply the rules fairly existed before Judge Wood made his decision. Judge Wood 
found it necessary to order ISDA to actually Derform its duties in the future. Prior to Judge Wood's 
ruling, Renzo complied with eveiy single rule that had been promulgated. ISDA had a duty to issue 
a permit if the rules were complied with. ISDA made its own rules and breached its duty. Hence, 
Judge Wood ruled that ISDA's actions were in violation of the law. 
In Crown v. State Department ofAgriculture, 127 Idaho 188,898 P.2d 1099 (Ct. App. 1994) 
bean growers bad filed an action against the Department of Agriculture for negligent inspection of 
a commodities warehouse. In addressing the issue of whether immunity should be afforded to the 
State under LC. $6-904B, the Crown Court stated that "to establish gross negligence under the 
statute, there must be evidence showing not only the breach of an obvious duty of care, but also 
showing ag'deliberate indifference" to the harmful consequences of others. Crown, 127 Idaho at 192 
- 193, 898 P.2d 1103-1104. Noticeably absent from the Crown decision is any discussion 
whatsoever as to whether a duty was owed by the Department of Agriculture to the bean growers. 
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The Crown Court went directly to the issue of gross negligence. Crown, 127 Idaho at 193,898 P.2d 
1103-1 104. Obviously, a duty was owed by the State or the Crown Court would have addressed the 
issue. Obviously, a duty was owed by the State of Idaho to Renzo, or there would have been no 
reason for Judge Wood to order the State treat Renzo fairly. 
Respondent argues that Renzo has "failed to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
the existence of gross negligence or reckless, willful and wanton conduct. Respondent's Brief, p. 
19. Somehow, it appears that Respondent has missed, or refused to acknowledge, the following 
facts: 
1. By ordering spaying and neutering of Renzo's tigers, Dr. Ledbetter blatantly 
disregarded all considerations for the protection of an endangered species. Indeed, 
Dr. Ledbetter did not even speak with any third party about how Renzo's breeding 
could protect the species. He simply refused to see how Renzo's operation could 
benefit the endangered species. 
2. Dr. Ledbetter did not even speak with Renzo before sending his October 17 letter. 
Dr. Ledbetter did not take into account Renzo's qualifications, documented past 
performance, or experience when he denied the propagation permit. 
3. Dr. Ledbetter gave absolutely no consideration to the Foundation's desires fulfill its 
mission and purpose through education and breeding. 
4. Dr. Ledbetter compared Renzo's operations with that of Jerry Korn, a person who 
over the course of time repeatedly violated the law with regard to the possession and 
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propagation of deleterious exotic animals. Renzo, on the other hand, complied with 
all laws and had a U.S.D.A. license which Korn did not. 
5. Dr. Ledbetter refused to grant apropagationpermit to Renzo who had complied with 
all laws and yet didn't even think about Idaho's zoos, one of which was breeding 
tigers without any propagation permits whatsoever, in clear violation of State law. 
Renzo has asserted and continues to assert that the above facts clearly present sufficient 
evidence to show deliberate indifference on the part of Dr. Ledbetter to the consequences to SABRE. 
The evidence in the record establishes that the S.A.B.R.E. Foundation would have generated 
substantial revenues for preservation, education and breeding programs had it been allowed to enter 
the State. The evidence further establishes that the S.A.B.R.E. Foundation was severely and 
irreparably hanned when it curtailed its operations in Nevada and then lost its sponsorship. The 
harm caused by refusing breeding permits to a Foundation who draws its revenues in part through 
breeding was substantial. The Stale's actions were reckless, and as a direct result of this 
recklessness, SABRE was irreparably harmed. 
Respondent also claims that a "reasonable person in a similar situation and of similar 
responsibility" would not "be inescapably drawn" to recognize a duty to issue not only a possession 
permit, but a propagation permit. Respondent's Brief, p. 19. Respondent State of Idaho appears to 
suggest that a reasonable person would not consider the plight of the endangered tigers. Respondent 
also seems to argue that it would not be reasonable to assist the efforts of an individual and a non- 
profit organization adamantly dedicated to the preservation of an endangered species. Respondent's 
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actions have left an unmistakable message with those desiring to protect an endangered species such 
as big cats in the State of Idaho through education and breeding. That message is, "Go somewhere 
else, you're not wanted here." 
IV 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, THROUGH DR. LEDBETTER, COMMITTED A 
WRONGFUL AND UNLAWFUL ACTION WITHOUT LEGAL JUSTIFICATION OR 
EXCUSE AND WITH ILL WILL 
Respondent asserts that "Renzo simply has offered no evidence of an "intentional 
commission of a wrongful or unlawful act, without legal justification or excuse and with ill will". 
Respondent's Brief, p. 16. The facts undisputedly show that Dr. Ledbetter committed a wrongful 
and unlawful act without IegaI justification or excuse. The district court made no finding otherwise. 
R., pp. 235 - 238. The only issue in determining whether the district court erred in finding that the 
State was immune under LC. $6-904(1) is whether Dr. Ledbetter acted with an ill will. 
The District Court utilized Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210,796 P.2d 87 (1990) 
as the standard for establishing ill will. R. Vol. I, p. 237 - 238. However, the central issues of 
Evans certainly did not involve a determination of malice on the part of the police officers. The 
Evans Court did not address the definition of "malice". Furthermore, the Evans decision clearly 
showed that the allegations of malice were not fully born out by the testimony. Thus, the district 
court's utilization of Evans was misplaced. 
In Anderson, 112 Idaho at 187,731 P.2d at 182 (1987) it was foundthat the termmalice had 
been various1 y defined. The Anderson Court determined that the term malice as used in 56-904 must 
refer to "actual malice". Id. This Court has indicated that actual malice is not defined as an evil 
intent or a motive arising from spite. Clarkv. Spokesman-Review, 144 Idaho 427,43 1,163 P.3d 220 
While not addressing "actual malice", this Court in Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & 
Rescue, 2008-ID 1020.142, addressed "malicious" as follows: 
The dictionary defines malicious as: "harboring ill will or enmity. 
. . proceeding from hatred or ill will . . . playfully or archly 
mischievous . . . [cllever, cunning . . . having or done with, wicked 
or mischievous intentions or motives . . . [illl-disposed, spiteful, 
resentful, bitter, rancorous, sinister, unpropitious." WEBSTER'S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1367 (1966). It 
is clear from the record that Curlee disliked Wheeler and Sharp and 
resented working with them. 
Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire &Rescue, 2008-ID 1020.142, p. 11. 
In the case at hand, the evidence is sufficient to satisfy the requirements for a showing of ill 
will. Rebecca Harris repeatedly attempted to get Dr. Ledbetter to understand the nature of the 
Foundation. Ledbetter replied that it wasn't his problem. R. Vol. I, p. 97. Dr. Ledbetter left the 
undeniable impression with Rebecca that he was picking on the Foundation just because he could. 
Peter Renzo understood that Dr. Ledbetter was very rude to Rebecca and would not answer her 
questions. R. Vol. I, p. 90. Because such actions satisfy the requirements of ill will under the case 
law cited above, the district court's decision regarding the malice issue must therefore be reversed. 
v 
THE STATE OF IDAHO TORTIOUSLY INTERFERED WITH SABRE'S 
PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE CLAIM 
Respondent argues that "it is not reasonable that Dr. Ledbetter could anticipate that the 
requirement of spaying and neutering would lead to termination of Renzo's economic expectancy". 
Respondent's Brief, p. 21. However, the undisputed evidence in the record establishes that Dr. 
Ledbetter was told that the Foundation had an investor who wanted to build a facility that would be 
open to the public and that would bring tourism and business to the community. Is it not reasonable 
to presume that if an investor is lined up, a prospective economic advantage is anticipated? 
Furthermore, Ledbetter was told repeatedly of the Foundation's purpose to preserve the tigers 
through education and breeding Is it not reasonable to presume that if the Foundation's mission is 
thwarted, its economic viability is also adversely affected? A fair person, without an agenda, could 
easily connect the two large dots and determine that the requirement of spaying and neutering would 
lead to termination of Renzo's economic expectancy. Dr. Ledbetter did not act reasonably, which 
resulted in substantial loss to Renzo. 
Despite Respondent's arguments that Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 
986 P.2d 996 (1999) does not support Renzo, the Highland Court's language regarding intent 
remains very applicable. Respondent's Brief, p. 20. Addressing the element of intent, The Highland 
Enterprises Court stated: 
The substantially certain aspect of appellants' conduct allows a 
finding of intent. Evenmore, regardless of the assertion that Highland 
was not the intended target of their activities and saving the trees was 
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the ultimate objective, intent can be shown even if the interference is 
incidental to the actor's intended purpose and desire, but known to 
him to be a necessary consequence of his action. 
Highland, 133 Idaho at 340- 341,986 P.2d at 1006-1007. 
The substantially certain aspect of Ledbetter's conduct allows a finding of intent here. The 
demand of spaying and neutering for an organization relying on breeding is disastrous. Even if the 
interference in Renzo's business activities was not Dr. Ledbetter's desire, such interference was 
certainly incidental to Dr. Ledbetter's intended purpose and desire. As per Highland, intent has 
definitely been established. The district court did not apply the standards set forth in Highland. 
Respondent claims that "Renzo has not shown how Dr. Ledbetter's discretionary decision 
constituted an "interference by improper means." Respondent's Brief, p. 21. For the reasons set 
forth below, Renzo strongly disagrees. 
In its summary judgment, the district courl stated: 
Furthermore, Renzo has not raised facts which would tend to suuuort 
& 
a theory that Ledbetter's denial of a propagation permit was wrongful 
by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself. As noted 
above, this Court finds that Renzo has not shown a duty on the part 
of ISDA, and thus Renzo cannot establish that Ledbetter's conduct 
was grossly negligent. 
R. Vol. I, p. 243 
As shown above, the State of Idaho certainly did have a duty to apply the rules fairly. Denial 
of a propagation permit was wrongful by some measure beyond the denial itself. Because Dr. 
Ledbetter made his own unlawful rules to issue the propagation permit. Furthermore, the State of 
Idaho had a duty to comply with the Endangered Species Act. Dr. Ledbetter's demand for spaying 
and neutering was in violation of the Endangered Species Act. The State's interference with 
Renzo's economic expectancy was ceitainly wrongful by some measure beyond the interference, as 
the interference violated State and Federal laws. 
VI 
ISDA OWED A DUTY TO RENZO TO PREVENT ECONOMIC LOSS 
AND BREACHED THAT DUTY 
Idaho has recognized two exceptions to the economic loss rule, the "special relationship" 
exception and the "unique circumstances" exception. Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 
296, 301, 108 P.3d 996 (2005). Although the district court addressed the "special relationship" 
exception, it's analysis simply ended when it found that Dr. Ledbetter owed no duty to Renzo. R., 
Vol I., pp. 247 -248. Renzo asserts by concluding that no duty was owed, the district court failed 
to apply the proper law, and if it had done so, summary judgment would have been precluded. 
Respondent is correct in asserting that neither Renzo's Complaint nor his Notice of Clam 
made any claim for non-economic loss or property damage. Respondent's Brief, p. 23. However, 
Respondent fails to acknowledge that the basis for Renzo's economic damages stems from Dr. 
Ledbetter's demand that the value of Renzo's tigers be diminished through sterilization. Renzo's 
damages resulted from the State's breach of its duty and demand that a "take" occur in violation of 
the ESA. Thus, an underlying issue of property damage has been expressed in Renzo's claims from 
the beginning. 
Renzo reasserts that the State performed the specialized function of granting breeding permits 
because it was the only entity which could issue breeding permits. By way of the rules then 
existing, the Department presented the position that it would give breed permits to qualified 
applicants. Through Dr. Ledbetter's statement to Renzo that he would check with the attorney 
general on the issuance of a propagation permit, he induced reliance. Dr. Ledbetter then refused to 
grant a permit, despite the reasonable information presented to him, and thereby breached the duty 
imposed upon the Department. The special relationship exception as set forth in Dufin should apply 
here. 
Alternatively, Renzo asserts that the unique circumstances exception applies. The unique 
circumstances exception involves "unique circumstances requiring a different allocation of risk." 
Just's Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462,470,583 P.2d 997,1005 (1978). Dufin v. Idaho 
CropZmprovementAssn., 126 Idaho 1002,1007-1008,895 P.2d 1195,1200 - 1201(1995). The risk 
of economic loss should be shifted to the State because of the State's total inability to promulgate 
proper rules for the issuance of possession and propagation permits. 
The evidence shows that Renzo relied on the rules then existing to plan for future 
development of the Foundation. Renzo complied with all of the rules. Then, when it was 
determined by Judge Wood that the State had no rules by which it could fairly issue permits, Renzo's 
plans were destroyed. Because the State did not have sufficient rules to begin with, the 
Administrator made his own rules, which were directly contrary the business plans of the Foundation 
and to federal laws protecting endangered species. These circumstances are unlike the circumstances 
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of the business lessee in Just's Inc. or the certification of seed potatoes in Duffin. The circumstances 
are totally unique. The unique circumstances exception should therefore apply, shifting the burden 
to the State for Renzo's losses. 
VII 
SABRE'S NOTICE OF TORT CLAIM WAS TIMELY FILED 
Respondent is correct in asserting that Renzo's Notice of Tort Claim describes two alledged 
wrongful acts, ISDA's demand that Renzo's tigers and other cats be spayed and neutered and ISDA's 
refusal to issue a Propagation Permit. R. p. 10. Respondent then claims that "ISDA's letter of 
October 17, 2007 provided ISDA's position not only on possession, but also propagation." 
Respondent's Brief, p. 11. Granted, the demand to spay and neuter certainly addresses the 
propagation. But it does not address the request for a propagation permit. The reason the October 
17 letter doesn't address a request for a propagation permit is that the issue didn't arise until Renzo's 
telephone conference with Dr. Ledbetter after the October 17 letter. 
The evidence shows that Dr. Ledbetter informed Renzo during that conversation that he 
would check with the attorney general about the propagation permit. The evidence shows no 
response from Dr. Ledbetter regarding his inquiry to the attorney general prior to counsel's letter of 
November 2. On November 16,2007, Dr. Ledbetter plainly acknowledges that counsel requested 
that the State issue a Propagation permit. Why would counsel request the issuance of a propagation 
permit if the wrongful act of denial of propagation permit had already been made? As indicated 
earlier, a request for reconsideration would have been made, not an initial request. 
The question then arises as to whether Renzo was "reasonably put on inquiry" that Dr. 
Ledbetter would deny a propagation permit upon receiving the October 17 letter in light of the 
evidence that Dr. Ledbetter told Renzo that he would check with the attorney general after the 
October 17 letter? The answer is a resounding "No." The facts do not support such a conclusion. 
The facts in the record support the conclusion that Renzo was reasonably put on notice of the 
wrongful act when Dr. Ledbetter stated on November 17 that the State of Idaho would not issue a 
propagation permit. End of story. 
Despite, the clamorings of Respondent, the district court's reliance on Magnuson Properties 
Partnership v. City of Coeur D-Alene 138 Idaho 166,59 P.3d 971 (2002) to conclude that Renzo 's 
tort claim is untimely is just plain wrong. Magnuson did not involve two tort claims. Magnuson 
didn't involve a situation in which the City reconsidered its position and said it would do more 
checking into the issue. Magnuson involved the reiteration of the denial of one request, not the 
denial of one request and the reaffirmation of another request after the initial affirmation had been 
reopened for further review. 
Dr. Ledbetter's October 17, 2007 letter to Peter Renzo was in direct response to Renzo's 
Deleterious Exotic Possession Permit Application. Dr. Ledbetter's denial of a propagation permit 
was in direct response to counsel's request for a propagation permit . R. Vol. I, p. 116. The facts 
simply do not render themselves to the application of Magnuson here. The district court's decision 
that the Tort claim was untimely must therefore be reversed. 
VIII 
RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES MUST BE DENIED 
Respondent seeks attorney fees on appeal pursuant to LC. $6-918A, asserting that Renzo 
exercised bad faith by asking this Court to second-guess the trial court's decision. Respondent's 
Brief, p. 25. This argument has no merit and is certainly not well taken. 
Bad faith is defined as "dishonesty in belief or purpose." Cordova v. Bonnevile County Joint 
Sch. Dist. No. 93, 144 Idaho 637, 643, 167 P.3d 774 (2007). This definition constitutes is an 
exceptionally rigorous standard. Caudle v. Bonneville County, 2009-ID-0506.078 (Ct. App. April 
30,2009) citing Bissett v. Unnamed Members of Political Compact, 11 1 Idaho 863,865,727 P.2d 
1291, 1293 (Ct. App. 1986). There is absolutely no way in the world that Renzo's arguments on 
appeal would satisfy this standard. 
Renzo has not requested the Court to second-guess the trial court's decision. Renzo has 
argued that the district court did not apply the correct law and asks this Court to make its own 
conclusions from the law presented. This can in no way constitute bad faith. 
Furthermore, Respondent only raised the issue of "second-guessing" once in its Brief. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 16. How can it now in good faith, claim that there was "second-guessing" 
on every issue? Respondent certainly cannot prove "bad faith" by clear and convincing evidence if 
it doesn't even address the issue on each of Renzo's arguments. 
Renzo has raised significant and substantial questions of law. An award of attorney fees is 
certainly not appropriate here. See Electrical Wholesale Supply Co. Inc. v. Nielson, 136 Idaho 814, 
41 P. 3d 242 (2002)(appeal asked the Court to reconsider the district court's findings of fact without 
raising significant questions of law, attorney fees were awarded). For these reasons, Respondent's 
request for attorney fees must be soundly rejected. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Renzo has clearly shown that the State violated laws, gave no consideration for the 
preservation of an endangered species, and wrongfully interfered with the S.A.B.R.E. Foundation's 
mission and economic growth. For these reasons, Appellant renews its request that the district 
court's Opinion and Order Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendant and correspondmg 
Judgment be reversed. 
DATED this 19" day of January, 2010. 
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